Likewise, if the master fixed the kitābah on a specific item of that sort, and—after taking possession of it—it was successfully claimed by its true owner, the emancipation stands while the former slave remains indebted for the item’s value. Some scholars of Medina hold that, in such a case, the entire transaction is rolled back to its original state until the slave either pays or defaults; the first view, however, is that of Mālik.

Mālik further says that the mukātab’s assets may be pursued to satisfy what he owes even if this was not expressly stipulated. His children, on the other hand, are not liable unless the master has expressly included them; if so, they become parties to the kitābah. The same applies to any child born to him after the contract: a son or daughter born to his slave-women automatically comes under the kitābah without need for a separate stipulation.

If the kitābah is concluded while the mukātab already owns a pregnant slave-woman, the woman herself remains his property, whereas her unborn child belongs to the master—unless the contract is explicitly extended to cover the fetus. Should he fail to do so, when she gives birth the child is the master’s and the mother the mukātab’s. Any child borne by that slave-woman from a pregnancy conceived after the kitābah follows the mukātab’s own status: if he is freed, the child is freed; if he returns to bondage, the child does likewise.

When a master grants a kitābah to his female slave while she is pregnant, or when she conceives after the contract, the child is, in either case, included in the kitābah with her. The master may not exempt the fetus, just as he could not exclude it were he to free her outright.

It is permissible for the master to stipulate, in addition to the payments, that the mukātab undertake a journey or render a service. If the mukātab pays the whole price in advance, the requirement to travel or serve is dropped—although another opinion holds that it is not dropped, and that emancipation is contingent upon its fulfilment. A third view allows the mukātab to pay the assessed value of that journey or service together with his instalments, obtain immediate freedom, and dispense with the actual performance.

All of this represents the doctrine of Mālik and his companions, though the distilled position of the school is that if, after settling every instalment, the mukātab retains property that counts as wealth—such as an animal set aside for sacrifice and the like—that property is appraised against him and he is required to surrender its value with his final payment. Any obligation involving a journey he was to make or a service he was personally to perform is waived.

If the kitābah were based on one month’s service, or something similar, and he pays the price in advance,