and scholars other than Mālik agree in this regard. If a man summons one of his slaves but another answers and he then says, “You are free,” only the slave he originally intended is emancipated. There is much disagreement among Mālik’s students on this point, yet the distilled position of his school is as I have just stated.
Should witnesses later testify to what took place, both slaves are freed—the first by the master’s own admission, the second by the testimony. Some maintain that only the slave the master consciously intended is set free; that opinion is the safer course for the muftī’s own religious responsibility, although the former view remains the official doctrine.
If he declares, “Every slave,” or “Every servant is free,” while owning both male and female slaves, they are all emancipated unless he inwardly excludes some of them, in which case his private intention prevails.
If he tells a slave, “You are nothing but free,” “You are free today,” or calls him, “My brother,” yet does not mean any of these expressions as manumission, the slave is not freed. But if he says, “You are free today,” genuinely intending emancipation, the slave becomes free forever.
If the owner delegates the act of manumission to two people, the declaration of only one of them is invalid unless they are merely acting as messengers, in which case the statement of either suffices.
When he says, “I have freed one of my slaves,” he is believed concerning the specific slave he had in mind; if he had no particular one in mind, he may choose whichever slave he wishes to manumit—unlike the situation in which he divorces one of his wives.
If witnesses testify that he freed his slave at some earlier date and the judge rules on the basis of their testimony, the slave is considered free from the day of judgment, not from the date mentioned by the witnesses. Any profits, produce, or rents the master has taken up to that judgment remain his.
Should the slave commit or suffer defamation, he is treated as a free man, and the defamer receives the prescribed punishment, provided the slander occurred after the date the witnesses recorded for the emancipation—even though that date preceded the court’s ruling. Some scholars of Medina and companions of Mālik rule that the proceeds must be returned and that the slave is free in every respect from the date recorded by the witnesses; the first view, however, is Mālik’s own.
Whoever mutilates his slave—cutting off his nose, hand, ear, finger, or any limb, castrating him, or burning him with fire—