and the perceptible istiwāʾ (establishment). What, then, do these names signify when they are attributed to Allah Most High, Who lies beyond the reach of our senses? According to that principle, the only possible answer is that they possess no meanings whatsoever; they are merely names for Him—precisely the doctrine of the Muʿtazilah, as the Shaykh himself relates from them. Indeed, in al-Madhāhib, p. 303, he writes:

“The Muʿtazilah denied the attributes, as we have explained, whereas al-Ashʿarī affirmed them. The latter held that the attributes are realities distinct from the Essence, so they affirmed power, will, knowledge, life, hearing, sight, and speech, declaring them other than the Essence. The Muʿtazilah, however, maintained that nothing exists besides the Essence, and that the expressions in the Qur’an such as ‘All-Knowing, All-Aware, All-Wise, All-Hearing, All-Seeing’ are merely His names.”

In other words, they concede no meanings to them; the names are no more than interchangeable labels. Consequently, the scholars censured them and charged them with nullifying the divine attributes, as is made clear in the writings of Shaykh al-Islam and others.

Will Shaykh Abū Zahrah, then, embrace the taʿṭīl that logically follows from his earlier statement—thereby aligning himself with the very Muʿtazilah whose view he reported, and denying the divine attributes proven by the Qur’an and Sunnah? Or will he retract that remark as a mere slip of the tongue and adopt the position Ibn Taymiyyah expounded so rigorously—affirming istiwāʾ as a real attribute of Allah, befitting His majesty, and likewise affirming all His attributes, such as knowledge and speech, without forcing them into metaphor and thus falling into taʿṭīl?

I had hoped to regard the Shaykh’s words as a momentary lapse, yet he himself makes that difficult, for—as will be shown—he leans toward interpreting istiwāʾ figuratively as “complete sovereignty” and the divine “descent” as a mere effusion of heavenly blessings, without realizing—poor man—that such an interpretation entails disbelief. For the ḥadīth of descent, as he well knows, continues: “Is there anyone who supplicates so that I may answer him? Is there anyone who seeks forgiveness so that I may forgive him? Is there anyone who asks so that I may grant him?” Are these “effusions” the ones that answer, forgive, and bestow—or is it Allah alone, without partner?

In sum, as regards what al-Kawtharī quoted from Ibn Taymiyyah, he wished to appear impartial toward him