names and verses, or does he rather state explicitly that they are all objective realities proportionate to their respective essences, and that their realities differ in accordance with the difference between those essences—while noting only that whatever of them falls under sensory perception we can know its reality, whereas that which lies beyond our perception, such as the attributes of Allah—indeed, even Paradise and Hell—remains a reality whose nature we do not know? He has already supplied you with examples that clarify for people this grave matter, ignorance of which was a major cause of their deviation from the way of the early generations regarding the divine attributes.

Thus we all say, ‘Allah exists,’ just as we say, ‘The creation exists.’ The existence ascribed to each is a reality befitting its essence. Likewise we say, ‘Allah is living,’ and, ‘I am living’; the life of each is a reality suited to its essence. The same principle runs consistently through all the names and attributes. In this respect Shaykh al-Islam’s words are clear, plain, and persuasive to anyone possessed of sound reason.

Now, if Shaykh Abū Zahrah failed to grasp Ibn Taymiyyah’s point and on that basis wrongly attributed figurative interpretation to him, that misreading is quite minor compared with another error found in his earlier remarks. He appears to believe that ‘these terms were originally coined for tangible, sensory meanings and, in their literal sense, cannot be applied to anything else; whenever they are applied to something other—whether that thing is known or unknown—they are being used outside their proper meaning…,’ and so forth, as he himself has said.

I submit: if the Shaykh truly holds this view, then the upshot of his words—were he aware of what they entail—while he debates Shaykh al-Islam under the sway of speculative theology, is that the existence, life, knowledge, and istiwāʾ of the created being are real, whereas the existence, life, knowledge, istiwāʾ, and other attributes of the Creator—glorified be He—are mere metaphors, not realities at all. The necessary consequence is that Allah does not truly exist, is not living, does not know, is not established upon the Throne, and so on—precisely the lines of argument advanced by the philosophers and by those Muʿtazilites and theologians who followed them.

We say this because the Shaykh—may Allah guide him and us—has himself declared that ‘these terms were originally coined for sensory meanings,’ while the existence, knowledge, life, and other attributes of Allah are not sensory. Hence, by his own criterion, they can be applied to Him only metaphorically. Has the Shaykh realized where such a statement has led him?

And if you have not noticed… then let me say: we are well acquainted with what tangible, sensory existence, life, and knowledge mean,