Thus, saying that two rulings coexist in the same locus—two obligations, two prohibitions, or two permissions—is like saying that two instances of blackness coexist there. Saying that there is a single, reinforced ruling is like saying that there is a single, intense blackness. Both statements mean the same thing, for reinforcement does not preclude multiple identical instances: reinforcement may itself be achieved through repetition, as in the words of the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace:

“By Allah, I shall surely march against Quraysh! By Allah, I shall surely march against Quraysh! By Allah, I shall surely march against Quraysh!”

The same applies when someone says, “then, then,” or “Zayd has come, Zayd has come,” and similar expressions. Thus, affirming multiple rulings and affirming a strong, reinforced ruling amount to the same thing.

It is clear that, whether one speaks of multiple rulings or of a strong, reinforced ruling, that whole results only from the two causes together. Neither cause has independently produced it, nor can either do so, whether the causes occur together or separately. Each is therefore part of the cause of this whole, not its cause in its own right.

It is equally clear that each of the two causes, when occurring alone, independently establishes the single ruling in its basic form. Yet the term “single” is ambiguous, just as the term “independence” is ambiguous. Someone who affirms that a cause operates independently when it occurs alone does not contradict someone who denies its independence when it occurs together with another cause. Likewise, if someone says that a single ruling may be attributed to two causes, meaning that either independently establishes it when occurring alone, there is no dispute about this.