their concurrence. Rather, we mean that the ruling is established by each of them, and that each independently establishes it when present alone.”

Thus, the latter do not dispute the former’s contention that, when the two causes coincide, neither independently establishes the ruling. Nor do the former dispute the latter’s contention that each cause independently establishes it when present alone. This, then, is the discussion concerning two concurrent causes.

As for the ruling established when they coincide, it may differ according to the cause, as with the permissibility of execution on grounds of apostasy, unlawful sexual intercourse, or retribution. These rulings are distinct, not identical; none takes the place of another. The rulings may also be identical, as with the invalidation of ablution.

Those who reject attributing a ruling to two causes say: “What the causes establish is a plurality of rulings, not a single ruling.” This is especially so for those who concede to them—in accordance with one of the two views held by jurists among the followers of al-Shāfiʿī, Ahmad, and others—that if someone intends, when performing ablution or a full ritual bath, to remove the ritual impurity arising from some of its causes, the other ritual impurity is not removed.

The disagreement over such concurrence in minor and major ritual impurity is well known. It relates to the coexistence of identical things in a single locus, and to whether identical things are mutually incompatible—a matter of well-known dispute.

Those who accept attributing a single ruling to two causes do not dispute that, when there is a concurrence of