Friday prayer while living far from the congregational mosque has omitted more than someone who lives nearby. Yet it is not said that his punishment is greater than that of someone who lives nearby.

An obligatory act is one whose omission is grounds for blame and punishment. If what a person is required to do as a subsidiary matter were itself an intended object of the obligation, the blame and punishment for omitting it would be greater. Thus, someone from India or al-Andalus who neglected Hajj would face greater punishment than someone from Mecca or al-Tā’if who neglected it; and someone from the farthest part of the city who neglected Friday prayer would face greater punishment than someone living beside the congregational mosque who neglected it. Since it is known that the person who lives farther away receives a greater reward, yet does not face greater punishment for omission than someone who lives nearby, the following uncertainty arose: is this obligatory or not?

The precise distinction is that its obligatory character follows by rational necessity, not because it is an intended object of the command. Indeed, someone who commands an act may not intend thereby to demand its prerequisites, even though he knows that they must exist. If the person issuing the command is liable to inattention, those prerequisites may not even occur to him.

Whoever understands this will find al-Ka‘bī’s objections concerning whether the Sharia contains anything merely permissible resolved. Al-Ka‘bī claimed that nothing in the Sharia is merely permissible … etc.

You will never find an innovator who does not love to conceal the scriptural texts that contradict him, hate those texts, and hate their being made known, transmitted, and discussed. He also hates those who do so, as one of the early generations said: