occurs only because one fails to perform the commanded action that would prevent it. It is thus established that what is commanded is something a person’s constitution impels him toward and needs, and upon which his well-being depends. It is like eating for the body—indeed, eating itself falls within what is commanded—and like marriage for humankind, which is also commanded. The cause of forbidden conduct arises within him only through the absence of what is commanded. Its occurrence therefore results from that absence. Hence, failing to do what is commanded is more harmful to him than committing what is forbidden, because that failure harms him in two ways. By neglecting what is commanded, he is also more deserving of blame and punishment, since he has within him an impulse toward it that helps him perform it. By contrast, there is originally no impulse within him toward what is forbidden except when what is commanded is absent. Its absence, in turn, is brought about only by performing what is commanded. Such is the case.

The seventeenth argument:

Doing good deeds entails abandoning bad deeds, whereas merely abandoning bad deeds does not entail doing good deeds. Refraining from bad deeds despite an impulse toward them can only occur through a good deed. Performing good deeds in the absence of such an impulse does not depend on refraining from a bad deed. One is rewarded for such restraint because one has refrained from bad deeds despite the impulse toward them.

This is because Allah created the son of Adam to be ever intent and ever active, as the Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, said:

“The truest names are Hārith and Hammām.”

A hārith is: