within one’s power through doing the opposite of what is forbidden. Doing that opposite thus becomes a means to what the one issuing the prohibition seeks, even if it is not itself the intended end. This is because something is prohibited on account of the harm it entails, so the aim is its absence—as with prohibitions against killing a person or drinking wine. A prohibition may also be imposed solely to try and test the person subject to religious obligations, as Saul’s people were forbidden to drink except for a handful. Here, the aim is their obedience and submission, which is something that actually exists. As such, it is obedience of the same kind as carrying out what is commanded. What is forbidden is therefore subordinate to what is commanded: the aim is either the absence of something detrimental to what is commanded, or a component of what is commanded. Since it either encompasses what is commanded or is a branch of it, this establishes that what is commanded is more perfect and nobler, and is the primary objective.

The fifteenth point:

Commands are foundational, while prohibitions are subsidiary, for a prohibition is a kind of command. A command is a request, a call for something, or a demand; this includes both requesting an action and requesting that it be left undone. Prohibition, however, has been given a distinct name. This accords with the customary usage of the Arabs: when a general category has two kinds, one distinguished by a quality of perfection or deficiency, they give that kind a separate name and retain the general name for the other. Thus they speak of a Muslim and a hypocrite, and of a prophet and a messenger.