anyone for neglecting any obligation whatsoever, even faith itself. He executes only one who wages war, on account of that warfare, which constitutes committing a forbidden act. He treats original and subsequent disbelief alike, and therefore does not execute an apostate who has not engaged in warfare. Nor does he execute someone who abandons prayer or zakat unless he belongs to a group that collectively resists compliance; he then fights them because they wage war, just as he fights rebels. As for forbidden acts, he executes the murderer, the adulterer who has been lawfully married, and the highway robber who kills. This may be answered in three ways:

First: In a dispute, the decisive criterion is to refer the matter to Allah and the Messenger. The Quran and Sunnah support what we have stated: there is agreement that an apostate is to be executed even if he does not belong to the class of combatants—for example, if he is blind, chronically disabled, or a monk. A prisoner of war may also be executed after capture, even though his warfare has ceased.

Second: Where execution is required, it is required as legal retribution, which rests upon equivalence: a life for a life, just as equivalent compensation is required in matters of property. Thus, the recompense for an evil deed is its equivalent, whether it concerns lives, property, honor, or bodies. However, if the offender has harmed only the person killed, the decision to execute him rests with the victim’s next of kin, because the right belongs to them, just as a person wronged in a financial matter has a right to his property. If, however, he killed the victim to seize his property, his execution becomes obligatory for the sake of the public interest, as a punishment prescribed by Allah, just as the thief’s hand must be cut off to protect property. The return of the stolen property, meanwhile, is the owner’s right: he may claim it or forgo it as he wishes. Thus, these cases fall outside