hold that he is to be executed only for abandoning prayer, but is not deemed a disbeliever, as in the well-known position of al-Shāfiʿī’s school, since what is due can be exacted from him. Deeming someone who abandons prayer a disbeliever is the well-known position transmitted from the majority of the early generations, including the Companions and their successors.

The dispute concerns someone who acknowledges that prayer is obligatory and commits himself to performing it, yet does not do so. As for someone who does not acknowledge its obligation, they agree that he is a disbeliever. The matter is not as one might understand from the unqualified statements of some jurists among Ahmad’s followers and others: that if he denies its obligation, he becomes a disbeliever, whereas if he does not deny its obligation, his case is disputed. Rather, there are three categories here:

The first is someone who denies its obligation: he is a disbeliever by consensus.

The second is someone who does not deny its obligation but refuses to commit himself to performing it out of pride, envy, or hatred of Allah and His Messenger. He says, “I know that Allah has enjoined it upon the Muslims and that the Messenger is truthful in conveying the Quran,” yet he refuses to commit himself to performing it out of arrogance, envy of the Messenger, partisan attachment to his own religion, or hatred of what the Messenger brought. Such a person is also a disbeliever by consensus. When Iblīs refused to prostrate as he had been commanded, he was not denying that it was obligatory, for Allah Most High had addressed him directly. Rather, he refused, acted arrogantly, and was among the disbelievers. Likewise, Abū Tālib was