had a ruling applicable to him, both inwardly and outwardly, as was said of those whose obligation to face the direction of prayer applied both inwardly and outwardly before its abrogation. Rather, it should be said: whoever has not received the abrogating text but has received the other text must follow it and act upon it. Accordingly, the rulings applicable to independent jurists differ according to their ability to ascertain the evidence. For someone unable to ascertain the stronger evidence, such as an abrogating text or one restricting the scope of a general text, Allah’s ruling is that he act upon the evidence he has been able to ascertain. Even if stronger, conflicting evidence actually exists, he is not obliged to follow it unless he is able to ascertain it.

Likewise, if a verse admits two meanings, and one of them is not apparent to a particular person, who recognizes only what is not apparent to another, he must act upon the evidence that has led him to that meaning, even though someone else must act upon the evidence that has led him to the other meaning. Each has fulfilled his obligation. Yet Allah’s ruling in reality is one, with the obligation to follow it conditional upon ability.

If it is said, “But Allah also commanded that person to do what he did,” the response is: He did not command that particular act as such. Rather, He commanded him to fear Allah as much as he could and to act according to what was apparent to him; and nothing but this was apparent to him. He is therefore commanded to do it insofar as it falls within the general category of what is within the independent jurist’s ability, known to him, and apparent to him—not on account of that particular act in itself.

Thus, whoever says, “He was not commanded to do it,” is correct. And whoever says, “He was commanded to do it insofar as it was what he was able to do, what he knew, what was apparent to him, and what the evidence indicated to him,” is correct.