Ahmad draws a distinction in this matter. If an issue is addressed by an authentic hadith with no evidence opposing it, anyone who follows a weak hadith or the opinion of a Companion is mistaken. If two authentic hadiths address the issue, he considers which carries greater weight and follows it, without declaring someone who follows the other mistaken. If no scriptural text addresses the issue, he exercises independent judgment, saying:

“I do not know whether I have reached the truth or missed it.”

Thus, he distinguishes between cases where there is a text that must be followed and cases where there is not. If someone follows one text while remaining unaware of another text addressing the issue, Ahmad does not call him mistaken, because he has done what was required of him.

This distinction, however, concerns determining who is in error. Some people say, “I do not categorically declare my opponent mistaken in matters open to independent judgment.” Others say, “I categorically declare him mistaken.” Ahmad distinguishes between cases, and this is the correct approach. Even when he categorically judges someone mistaken in the sense of lacking knowledge, he does not categorically judge him sinful. The latter judgment applies only to someone known not to have exercised independent judgment.

The reality is that a text may remain unknown to a jurist exercising independent judgment, who has no means of learning of it, although he would have been obliged to follow it had he known it. Because it remained unknown to him, he followed another text that had been abrogated or whose scope had been restricted. He has thereby done what was required of him to the best of his ability, like those who prayed facing Jerusalem after that direction of prayer had been abrogated but before they learned of the abrogation.

This is because, according to the soundest view, a scriptural ruling does not become binding upon those legally accountable until they have the opportunity to learn of it. Another view holds that it takes effect in the sense of requiring the act to be made up, but not