an unbelieving slave.

If he prays in a permissible place, he has complied by performing the obligation through a particular instance that is not prohibited. If he prays on usurped property, it may be argued: The prohibition concerns being there in general, not specifically praying there. He has therefore performed the obligation through something he was not forbidden to use for compliance, although the general category to which his act belongs was prohibited. Thus, this particular act combines what is commanded—prayer in general—and what is prohibited—being there in general. He is therefore both obedient and disobedient. We do not say that this particular act is both commanded and prohibited; rather, it combines what is commanded and what is prohibited, just as when someone prays while engaging in a sin, such as carrying a usurped item.

Alternatively, it may be argued: He is indeed forbidden to comply through this act, just as he is forbidden to comply by praying in an impure place or an impure garment. This is because prayer requires a place, and prohibiting a general category entails prohibiting its particular kinds. He would therefore be forbidden to perform part of this prayer. This differs from a prohibited act that is separate from the prayer’s constituent parts, such as carrying a garment, for carrying it is not part of the prayer. This is the point that jurists examine, and it is open to independent legal reasoning. The question is not whether these very acts of occupying a place are both commanded and prohibited, for that is certainly false. Rather, even if these particular acts are prohibited, they include what is commanded; yet something that includes what is commanded in general is not thereby itself commanded.

It may then be said: Even if compliance in a particular manner were prohibited, as when one is told: