from being in it, this prohibited act is not something he has been commanded to do. What is commanded is unqualified, and this particular instance is not indispensable to it. Rather, compliance is achieved through it just as it is achieved through other instances.

If it is said, “Even if it is not commanded, fulfilling the command through it must nevertheless be permissible; yet combining prohibition and permissibility combines two contradictories,” the reply is: Fulfilling the command through it need not be declared permissible. It is enough that fulfilling the command through it is not prohibited. The means by which one performs an obligation need not itself be made obligatory or declared permissible. It is enough that fulfilling the command by that means is not prohibited. If fulfilling the command by that means is prohibited, however, the commanded act cannot be included in it without disobedience.

There are thus four cases:

The means of compliance may itself be obligatory, as when fasting the month of Ramadan is made obligatory by abstaining during it from what is obligatory.

It may be permissible, as with the alternative acts of expiation, since each kind of act has been permitted to the person concerned. Another example is saying, “Feed Zayd or ʿAmr.”

It may simply not be prohibited, as with fasting or freeing a slave without further qualification. The particular instance is neither prohibited nor declared permissible by a specific directive, since there is no need for that.

The fourth case is that it is prohibited, as with the prohibition on defective sacrificial animals and freeing