as a particular act in a particular place. Thus, in all unqualified commands, the particular instance is not itself specifically commanded. Rather, what is commanded is unqualified, and the unqualified is realized through a particular instance.
A particular instance therefore has two aspects: its individual particularity and its unqualified nature. It is the unqualified nature that is obligatory. Its individual particularity, however, is neither obligatory nor commanded; it is merely one of the instances through which the unqualified is realized, like a route to Mecca. The one issuing the command does not intend any particular specification. This discussion occurs in connection with obligations allowing a choice, unqualified obligations, and specifically designated obligations.
The distinction between them is that an obligation allowing a choice commands one of a limited set of things, whereas an unqualified obligation does not command one of a limited set of things; rather, it commands something without qualification.
Hence the disagreement concerning an obligation allowing a choice: is only the common element obligatory, as with an unqualified obligation? Or are both the common element and the distinguishing element obligatory, with a choice between the alternatives?
There are two views on this. The common element is simply being one of those alternatives. On the former view, what distinguishes one alternative from another does not earn the reward accorded to an obligation, unlike the view that the distinguishing element is also obligatory as one of the alternatives.
As for an unqualified obligation, the distinct particular instances are not intentionally addressed by the command. Nevertheless, a particular instance is necessary for actual performance. It therefore falls under the heading of that without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled. Even if this is said to be obligatory, it is obligatory in performance while still allowing a choice. Choosing one of the two particular instances does not make that instance specifically obligatory.
It thus becomes clear that specifying the particular act and the particular place is not commanded. Thus, if one is prohibited