our school’s theologians and jurists.

Others say that it is rationally possible, but that the impediment rests on revealed evidence. This view may also be held by those in our school, and those who agree with them, who maintain that the obligation is not discharged. In my view, it is more consistent with Ahmad’s position, for his principles imply that all of this could conceivably be prescribed in religious law. This accords with the principles of Ahl al-Sunnah and the leading jurists. Others, including most jurists, hold that it is possible both rationally and under religious law.

Still others deem it rationally impossible but say that revealed evidence establishes its occurrence. This is the position of Ibn al-Bāqillānī, Abū al-Hasan, and Ibn al-Khatīb. They claimed that reason precludes a single act from being both commanded and prohibited. Yet when transmitted evidence—whether consensus or otherwise—indicated that making up the act was not obligatory, they said: “The obligation is discharged upon its occurrence, but not by virtue of it.” In my view, this is the most unsound of these positions.

The correct view is that this is rationally possible. Whether it actually occurs under religious law must be determined by the relevant evidence. For a single act to be both loved and disliked, pleasing and displeasing, commanded and prohibited, and deserving of praise and reward as well as blame and punishment is not a matter of inherent attributes such as being black or white, moving or still, alive or dead—though these attributes, too, warrant discussion. Rather, it belongs to