the full wages, even if he is entitled to part of them.”

I have discussed this issue at length elsewhere and explained its connection to a major principle: a single individual or act may be subject to command in one respect and prohibition in another. This is the position of Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamā‘ah, contrary to the Khawārij and the Mu‘tazilah.

A group of affirmationists—their theologians and jurists, both from our school and others—have agreed with them concerning a single act, an issue discussed in the principles of jurisprudence. They maintain that an act cannot be both commanded and prohibited, although they disagree with them concerning a single individual, an issue discussed in the foundations of religion.

There is no doubt that, according to one of the two positions reported from Ahmad, such an act does not discharge the obligation. The case in question is prayer in a usurped house. According to the other reported position, it does discharge the obligation, as most jurists hold. However, some scholars of our school have treated this as a question of reason and held that it is not rationally impossible. This is the position of most of the Mu‘tazilah and many of the Ash‘arīs, such as Ibn al-Bāqillānī and Ibn al-Khatīb.

The discussion thus concerns two distinct questions: whether this is rationally possible, and whether it discharges the obligation under religious law. There are four positions on the matter. Some maintain that it is rationally impossible and invalid under religious law. This is the position of a group of