the original case, we apply the ruling wherever the shared underlying factor is present. If, however, we know that he intended to restrict the ruling to the case addressed by the text, we disallow analogy. Thus, we know that Hajj is specifically associated with the Kaaba, obligatory fasting with the month of Ramadan, the direction faced in prayer with the Kaaba, and obligatory prayers with the five daily prayers, and so forth. In such cases, we cannot extend the ruling by analogy beyond what the text specifies.

When the Lawgiver specifies a place or time for worship, such as the Kaaba and the month of Ramadan, or specifies particular words and actions, such as recitation, bowing, and prostration in prayer—indeed, specifying the declaration “Allah is greatest” and the Opening Surah—extending this to something not specified in the text resembles the conduct of the people of Yemen who disregarded the designation of the sacred months. They said, “What is intended is any four months of the year.” Allah Most High therefore said:

“Postponing the sacred months is only an increase in disbelief, by which those who disbelieve are led astray. They permit it one year and forbid it another, so as to match the number of months Allah has made sacred, thereby permitting what Allah has forbidden.”

Drawing an analogy between what a revealed text permits and what a revealed text forbids is of the same kind as the analogy of those who said:

“‘Trade is only like usury.’ But Allah has permitted trade and forbidden usury.”

Likewise, the polytheists drew an analogy between carrion and properly slaughtered animals, saying, “Do you eat what you have killed but not what Allah has killed?” Allah Most High said:

“The devils surely inspire their allies to argue with you. If you obey them, you will indeed be polytheists.”

These are unsound analogies. Every analogy that a revealed text shows to be unsound is unsound. And anyone who equates