to which they had not found their way, while omitting the specious arguments and falsehoods into which they have fallen, numerous and inconsistent as these are. I have explained this general point in detail elsewhere.

If, however, “revealed knowledge” means knowledge whose acquisition is prescribed by revelation, this includes all knowledge that is recommended or obligatory, and may also include permissible knowledge. On this understanding, the foundations of religion also belong to revealed knowledge. Even what is known through reason alone belongs to revealed knowledge if revelation commands that it be known.

Accordingly, revealed knowledge falls into two categories: rational and transmitted. Here, “transmitted” replaces “revealed” as used in the first classification. It is thus clear that any rational knowledge which revelation commands us to acquire, or for which it provides evidence, is also revealed knowledge—whether by virtue of that command, that evidence, or both.

This clarification shows that rational knowledge falling outside the category of revealed knowledge—that which the Lawgiver neither commands us to acquire nor provides evidence for—is on a par with crafts such as farming, building, and weaving. This applies only to branches of knowledge of lesser merit and inferior rank. It also becomes clear that the category of revealed knowledge is nobler and broader, and that rational and revealed knowledge overlap in scope: neither constitutes a mutually exclusive alternative to the other. Rather, transmitted knowledge is the counterpart of rational knowledge. A body of knowledge can thus be rational while also being revealed in all three respects: the Lawgiver has communicated it, commanded its acquisition, and provided evidence for it. Reflect, then, that attribution