the way it is acquired and the evidence on which it rests. Thus, in the first sense, we speak of “knowledge prescribed by the revealed law,” just as we speak of “action prescribed by the revealed law.” The second usage is analogous to speaking of “rational knowledge” and “knowledge based on transmitted revelation.” In the first case, knowledge is considered in terms of praise and blame, reward and punishment, and command and prohibition: this belongs to prescriptive discourse. In the second, it is considered in terms of how it is acquired, its evidence, its soundness or unsoundness, and its correspondence or lack of correspondence to reality: this belongs to informative discourse.

Each of these two categories is, in turn, divided into two. Once it is understood that what is termed religious may be either what the Lawgiver has communicated or what He has commanded, then, regarding what He has communicated, He may either explain a rational proof for it or mention none. What He has commanded may either be intended by the Lawgiver in its own right or be necessary for His intended purpose—that without which His obligatory or recommended purpose cannot be achieved. These, then, are four categories.

If you wish, you may also divide what is commanded into what is known through reason alone and what is also known through revelation; it is then religious in respect of both communication and command.

For “known through revelation” must mean either that the Lawgiver has communicated it or that He has pointed to evidence for it. When it means what the Lawgiver has pointed to—as when He points to the signs of divine lordship, the evidence for messengership, and the like—then something can be both religious and rational. For when the Lawgiver drew people’s minds to the signs, proofs, and lessons, their minds were guided and came to know what He had guided them to.