(ح)
in that category, a single subject can lack both opposites, whereas no contingent thing can be neither existent nor nonexistent. Moreover, on this understanding, all the Lord’s attributes are necessary to Him. Thus, saying, “Either He is living, or knowing, or hearing, or seeing, or speaking—or He is not,” is like saying, “Either He exists or He does not.” The latter is an opposition of negation and affirmation, so the former must be likewise. This establishes the point intended.

If it is said, “This is not valid unless it is known that He can possess these attributes,” the reply is: This overlap between the two occurs only with attributes that a subject can possess and then lose, as in the case of an animal. As for the Lord, Most High, if these attributes are affirmed of Him, they are necessarily His. For all rational people agree that He cannot alternate between possessing them and lacking them. That would entail His being alive at one time and dead at another, deaf at one time and hearing at another. This would entail His being characterized by imperfections, which is categorically ruled out.

The case is different with someone who denies these attributes and says that denying them implies no imperfection, because he supposes that He cannot possess them. Someone who says this cannot maintain that, even if He could possess them, denying them would imply no imperfection. The invalidity of this is self-evident.

He may also be told: If, in the opposition of negation and affirmation, you require that both alternatives be known to be possible, you could not say that the Necessary Existent is either existent or nonexistent;