this community, whether in fundamental or subsidiary matters. The majority of both groups—the speculative theologians and the proponents of juristic opinion—rejected this position of ʿUbayd Allah. Others, however, say:

“This is the position of the early generations and the leading authorities in issuing fatwas, such as Abū Hanīfah, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Thawrī, Dāwūd ibn ʿAlī, and others. They do not deem someone sinful for an error in independent judgment, whether in fundamental or subsidiary matters, as Ibn Hazm and others have reported from them. This is why Abū Hanīfah, al-Shāfiʿī, and others accepted the testimony of adherents of deviant doctrines, except the Khattābiyyah, and regarded prayer behind them as valid. A disbeliever’s testimony against Muslims, however, is not accepted, nor may prayer be performed behind him.”

They said:

“This is the position known from the Companions, those who followed them in righteousness, and the imams of the religion: they do not declare anyone who errs in exercising independent judgment to be a disbeliever, an evildoer, or sinful, whether in a matter of practice or of knowledge.”

They said: “The distinction between subsidiary and fundamental matters originated only among the proponents of religious innovation: the speculative theologians, the Muʿtazilah, the Jahmiyyah, and those who followed their path. This position then passed to people who discussed it in works on the principles of jurisprudence without understanding its true nature or its deeper implications.”

They said:

“Besides being an innovation introduced into Islam, unsupported by the Quran, the Sunnah, or consensus—and never advocated by any of the early generations or the imams—this distinction between fundamental and subsidiary matters is also rationally invalid. For those who distinguish between what they designate as questions of