incurs sin and is mistaken, just as in theoretical questions. If, however, there is no conclusive evidence concerning them, then Allah has no intrinsic ruling on them; rather, Allah’s ruling for each person exercising independent judgment is whatever conclusion his judgment leads him to. Those who hold this position agree with the first group that error and sin necessarily go together and that everyone who is mistaken incurs sin.

They disagree with them, however, concerning questions open to independent judgment, saying that there is no conclusive evidence concerning them. In their view, probable opinion rests on no evidence; it is merely a matter of people’s inclinations towards one thing rather than another. They thus treat beliefs based on probability as akin to acts of will. They claim that there is, in reality, no ruling to be sought through independent judgment, and that sin is, in reality, an indication that outweighs another indication. This is the position of Abū al-Hudhayl al-‘Allāf and his followers, such as al-Jubbā’ī and his son. It is also one of al-Ash‘arī’s two positions, and the better-known of them. It is the position adopted by Judge al-Bāqillānī, Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī, Abū Bakr ibn al-‘Arabī, and their followers. We have discussed this at considerable length elsewhere.

Their opponents, such as Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī and others among the Ash‘arīs and beyond, say: “This position begins in sophistry and ends in heresy.” This is the position of those who say that everyone exercising independent judgment on practical questions open to such judgment is correct both in reality and outwardly. For, in their view, a person cannot exercise independent judgment and be mistaken, except in the sense that certain matters remain hidden from him. What remains hidden from him, however, is not Allah’s ruling, either