(هـ)
as possessing power, He would be described as possessing incapacity; and if He were not described as possessing hearing, sight, and speech, He would be described as possessing deafness, muteness, and speechlessness. Applying the same reasoning, if He were not described as separate from the world, He would be within it. Thus, negating one of two opposing attributes of Him entails affirming the other. That other attribute is a deficiency from which even a perfect created being is free; the Creator is therefore all the more deserving of being declared free from it.

This approach differs from our saying that these are attributes of perfection possessed by created beings, and that the Creator is therefore all the more deserving of them. Establishing attributes of perfection in their own right differs from establishing them by negating what contradicts them. A group of those who deny the divine attributes raised a well-known objection to this approach, misleading people with it. Consequently, many who affirm the attributes came to regard the objection as sound and, on its basis, to consider the argument for affirmation weak. Some speculative thinkers did this, even al-Āmidī and others like him (1), although this objection forms the basis of the position held by the esoteric Qarmatians and their like among the Jahmiyyah.

They said:

The assertion that, if He did not possess these attributes—such as hearing, sight, and speech—while being alive, He would possess their opposites can only be properly examined once the nature of two opposites and their categories have been explained. We therefore say: