the foundations of knowledge and faith. The more firmly a person adheres to this principle, the closer he is to the truth in knowledge and practice. Among those furthest from the truth in knowledge and practice are the Qarmatians and adherents of philosophy who suppose that the messengers did not know the truths of the divine and universal sciences. Such knowledge, they claim, belongs only to those philosophers who attain it. They say that the distinguishing feature of prophethood is imaginative representation, and accord prophethood superiority over other attainments among the masses, but not among people of knowledge. Al-Fārābī and others like him express these and similar views, as do Mubashshir ibn Fātik and his like among the Ismā'īlīs.

Others acknowledge that the Messenger knew these truths, but say that he did not explain them; rather, he addressed the masses through imaginative representation. They thus locate imaginative representation in his discourse, not in his knowledge. This is the view of Ibn Sīnā and others like him.

Still others acknowledge that the messengers knew the truth and explained it, but say that it cannot be known from their words. Rather, it must be known by another route: through reason, according to one group, or through spiritual unveiling, according to another—either philosophical syllogism or Sufi imagination. Only then are the Messenger’s words examined: whatever agrees with that is accepted, while whatever contradicts it is either left uninterpreted or reinterpreted. This is the approach of many Jahmī and Mu'tazilī speculative theologians. It is also the approach of the best among the Bātinīs and philosophers, who hold the Messenger in high esteem and regard him as above ignorance and lying, yet resort to reinterpretation.