believes it to be forbidden must refrain from it. Thus, the ruling follows the belief.

They said: “The rulings of Islamic law vary according to the circumstances of legally accountable persons, both in their juristic reasoning and in other respects. This is demonstrated by the agreement of the jurists and Ahl al-Sunnah that juristic reasoning and belief can remove sin and punishment, as the revealed texts establish, and that obligation and prohibition vary according to residence and travel, ritual purity and menstruation, inability and ability, and other such circumstances. Rulings may therefore vary according to beliefs, and, in the absence of a revealed text, the ruling applicable to a jurist exercising independent reasoning may be whatever he believes it to be.” This summarizes their position.

The early generations, the jurists, the Sufis, ordinary people and the majority of speculative theologians reject this position, holding that it contradicts the Quran, the Sunnah and the consensus of the early generations. Indeed, it contradicts sound reason. Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī and others even said: “This doctrine begins in sophistry and ends in heresy.” What he means is that sophistry makes realities dependent upon beliefs, as we explained earlier. Whoever maintains that obligation and prohibition depend upon beliefs has thus engaged in sophistry concerning practical rulings, even if he does not do so concerning judgments about objective realities. We have already explained that no rational person ordinarily engages in sophistry about everything—whether mistakenly or deliberately, through misguidance or obstinacy, out of ignorance or feigned ignorance.

As for its ending in heresy, this is because it abolishes commands and prohibitions, obligation and prohibition, and the threat of punishment in these matters, leaving a person free to declare something obligatory if he wishes, or, if he wishes,