this as a kind of discourse and opinion that arises in people’s minds, not as a class of human beings. In any case, it is well known that false imaginings frequently occur to human beings—indeed, they are beset by them—and that they deny the truth, either obstinately or mistakenly, in many matters and circumstances. Yet someone who denies one truth may acknowledge another, or acknowledge that same truth at another time. Thus, the ignorance and obstinacy that constitute sophistry are particular and limited among them, not universal and unrestricted. Some may be afflicted with it in every respect, though not persistently; others may be persistently afflicted with it concerning one particular matter. An individual may be afflicted with it either alongside an impairment of reason that removes religious accountability—namely, insanity—or while possessing the sound reason required for religious accountability. But I know of no individual who is ignorant of everything and obstinately denies everything, such that he would be a Sophist.

Further evidence that this has not occurred, even according to the speculative theologians, is that many speculative theologians among the people of hadith and Sunnah, as well as others, say:

The rational capacity required for religious accountability is a kind of necessary knowledge, such as knowledge of the necessity of what is necessary, the possibility of what is possible, and the impossibility of what is impossible. They support this by arguing that no rational person is devoid of some such knowledge. This is the position of Judge Abū Bakr, Ibn al-Bāqillānī, Abū al-Tayyib al-Tabarī, Judge Abū Ya‘lā, Ibn ‘Aqīl, and others. Thus, anyone who takes this as