If, then, he says:

“The basis for this distinction is revelation: whatever revelation conveys is affirmed, whereas whatever it does not convey is not affirmed,”

he is told, first: Revelation is the truthful messenger’s report of things as they actually are. Whatever the truthful messenger reports, whether by way of negation or affirmation, is true. A report is evidence for what it reports, but evidence does not entail the converse: its absence does not necessarily entail the absence of what it indicates. Thus, something not mentioned in revelation may nevertheless be established in reality, provided revelation has not denied it.

It is known that revelation has not denied these things by their particular names. One must therefore identify what in revelation rules them out; otherwise, it would not then be permissible to deny them, just as it would not be permissible to affirm them.

Furthermore, there must be a distinction in reality between what is affirmed of Him and what is denied of Him. Things alike with respect to possibility, necessity, and impossibility cannot be assigned different statuses in these respects. What is denied must therefore differ from what is affirmed in some respect that warrants its denial; likewise, what is affirmed must differ from what is denied in some respect that warrants its affirmation.

This may also be expressed as follows: There must be a reason requiring the denial of whatever must be denied of Allah, just as there must be a reason establishing whatever is affirmed of Him. If revelation is sufficient, then it reports things as they actually are. What, then, is the distinction in reality between the two?

The reply is:

Whatever negates the attributes of perfection established for Allah is something He is exalted above, for the affirmation of one of