Majmu' al-FatawaIbn Taimiya

In essence, this amounts to comparing a thing with its counterpart and subsuming the particular under the universal. The former is called analogical reasoning, and the latter syllogistic reasoning. The two necessarily entail one another: the feature shared by the individual instances in syllogistic reasoning, which logicians call the “middle term,” is the same shared feature in analogical reasoning that scholars of legal theory call the common factor, the basis of the ruling, the effective cause, the indicator, the prompting factor, the motivating factor, the factor calling for the ruling, the factor necessitating it, the shared attribute, and other such expressions.

As for inferring the basis of a ruling, this is analogy proper: a ruling is explicitly laid down concerning certain cases, and one might suppose that it applies exclusively to them. It is then established by inference that other cases are equivalent to them, either because there is no relevant distinction between them, or because they share the attribute to which, as the evidence establishes, the Lawgiver attached the ruling in the original case. This is the analogy accepted by the great majority of scholars and rejected by those who deny analogy.

Errors frequently arise in this because the common factor to which the Lawgiver attached the ruling is not known. This is the issue addressed by what is called the “demand for proof”: the objector requires the proponent of the argument to establish that the attribute shared by the original case and the new case is the effective cause of the ruling, or an indication of that cause. Most errors made by those who reason by analogy arise from supposing something to be the effective cause in the original case when it is not. Hence their frequent denunciations of those who employ unsound analogy.

But if evidence establishes that the distinction is irrelevant, and that there is no difference between the original case and the new case on account of which the Lawgiver would distinguish between the two cases; or if there is

وَحَقِيقَةُ ذَلِكَ يَرْجِعُ إلَى تَمْثِيلِ الشَّيْءِ بِنَظِيرِهِ وَإِدْرَاجِ الْجُزْئِيِّ تَحْتَ الْكُلِّيِّ وَذَاكَ يُسَمَّى قِيَاسَ التَّمْثِيلِ؛ وَهَذَا يُسَمَّى قِيَاسَ الشُّمُولِ وَهُمَا مُتَلَازِمَانِ فَإِنَّ الْقَدْرَ الْمُشْتَرَكَ بَيْنَ الْأَفْرَادِ فِي قِيَاسِ الشُّمُولِ الَّذِي يُسَمِّيهِ الْمَنْطِقِيُّونَ الْحَدَّ الْأَوْسَطَ هُوَ الْقَدْرُ الْمُشْتَرَكُ فِي قِيَاسِ التَّمْثِيلِ الَّذِي يُسَمِّيهِ الْأُصُولِيُّونَ الْجَامِعَ؛ وَالْمَنَاطَ؛ وَالْعِلَّةَ؛ وَالْأَمَارَةَ؛ وَالدَّاعِي وَالْبَاعِثَ؛ وَالْمُقْتَضِيَ؛ وَالْمُوجِبَ؛ وَالْمُشْتَرَكَ؛ وَغَيْرَ ذَلِكَ مِنْ الْعِبَارَاتِ. وَأَمَّا تَخْرِيجُ الْمَنَاطِ وَهُوَ: الْقِيَاسُ الْمَحْضُ وَهُوَ: أَنْ يَنُصَّ عَلَى حُكْمٍ فِي أُمُورٍ قَدْ يَظُنُّ أَنَّهُ يَخْتَصُّ الْحُكْمُ بِهَا فَيَسْتَدِلُّ عَلَى أَنَّ غَيْرَهَا مِثْلُهَا إمَّا لِانْتِفَاءِ الْفَارِقِ؛ أَوْ لِلِاشْتِرَاكِ فِي الْوَصْفِ الَّذِي قَامَ الدَّلِيلُ عَلَى أَنَّ الشَّارِعَ عَلَّقَ الْحُكْمَ بِهِ فِي الْأَصْلِ؛ فَهَذَا هُوَ الْقِيَاسُ الَّذِي تُقِرُّ بِهِ جَمَاهِيرُ الْعُلَمَاءِ وَيُنْكِرُهُ نفاة الْقِيَاسِ. وَإِنَّمَا يَكْثُرُ الْغَلَطُ فِيهِ لِعَدَمِ الْعِلْمِ بِالْجَامِعِ الْمُشْتَرَكِ الَّذِي عَلَّقَ الشَّارِعُ الْحُكْمَ بِهِ وَهُوَ الَّذِي يُسَمَّى سُؤَالَ الْمُطَالَبَةِ وَهُوَ: مُطَالَبَةُ الْمُعْتَرِضِ لِلْمُسْتَدِلِّ بِأَنَّ الْوَصْفَ الْمُشْتَرَكَ بَيْنَ الْأَصْلِ وَالْفَرْعِ هُوَ عِلَّةُ الْحُكْمِ؛ أَوْ دَلِيلُ الْعِلَّةِ. فَأَكْثَرُ غَلَطِ الْقَائِسِينَ مِنْ ظَنِّهِمْ عِلَّةً فِي الْأَصْلِ مَا لَيْسَ بِعِلَّةِ وَلِهَذَا كَثُرَتْ شَنَاعَاتُهُمْ عَلَى أَهْلِ الْقِيَاسِ الْفَاسِدِ. فَأَمَّا إذَا قَامَ دَلِيلٌ عَلَى إلْغَاءِ الْفَارِقِ وَأَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بَيْنَ الْأَصْلِ وَالْفَرْعِ فَرْقٌ يُفَرِّقُ الشَّارِعُ لِأَجْلِهِ بَيْنَ الصُّورَتَيْنِ؛ أَوْ قَامَ

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