and are known to be true. As for establishing a ruling solely on their basis, this is impermissible by consensus. The law of those before us is law for us only where it has been established that it was indeed their law—not simply whatever they have related to us. Many devotees, storytellers, some Quran commentators, and some speculative theologians err in this regard.

As for the latter category, it includes reports from the ancient philosophers and their like; what is cast into the hearts of Muslims while awake or asleep; what reasoning indicates concerning foundational or subsidiary matters; and the statements of the leading figures of this faith, both its scholars and its rulers. Such following of others, reasoning, and inspiration contain both truth and falsehood: they are neither to be rejected wholesale nor accepted wholesale.

The weakest of these is what is transmitted through a weak chain from someone whose statements do not constitute authoritative evidence, such as reports from the ancients. This differs from reliably transmitted reports from some members of our own community: their transmission is sound, but the speaker may be mistaken or correct. Following the actions of certain people, as recounted in anecdotes, is also a form of following others.

These things are not to be rejected unconditionally, because they contain elements that accord with the truth; nor are they to be accepted unconditionally, because they contain falsehood. Rather, whatever in them accords with the truth is accepted, and whatever is false is rejected.

Rational arguments concerning foundational matters and legal analogies concerning subsidiary matters fall into this category. Not all rational arguments are sound, nor are they all unsound; rather, they contain both truth and falsehood.