For the shared aspect is what is denoted by “existence,” “an existent being,” “life,” “living,” “knowledge,” “knowing,” “hearing,” “sight,” “one who hears,” “one who sees,” “power,” or “powerful.” This shared aspect is an unrestricted universal, not exclusive to either of the two. Thus, they share neither what is exclusive to the contingent being that has come into existence nor what is exclusive to the necessarily existent, eternal Being. Whatever is exclusive to either cannot be shared by both.

If the aspect they share is an attribute of perfection, such as existence, life, knowledge, or power, and contains nothing indicating the distinctive characteristics of created beings—just as it indicates none of the distinctive characteristics of the Creator—then there is nothing objectionable whatsoever in affirming it. Indeed, affirming this is a necessary consequence of existence: any two existent beings must share something of this kind. Whoever denies this must consequently deny the existence of every existent being. Hence, when the leading scholars recognized that this was the true implication of the Jahmiyyah’s position, they called them “negators.” Jahm denied that Allah could be called a “thing,” though the Jahmiyyah sometimes said, “He is a thing unlike other things.” Thus, denying any shared aspect whatsoever entails universal negation.

The meanings conveyed by descriptions of the Lord Most High—such as life, knowledge, and power, and indeed existence, actuality, reality, and the like—have implications that must necessarily hold. For whenever something holds, its necessary implications also hold. The distinctive characteristics of created beings, from which the Lord must be declared free, are not among the necessary implications of these meanings at all. Rather, they are necessary implications of the existence, life, knowledge, and similar qualities peculiar to created beings.