Thus, when these people describe those who affirm the divine attributes as guilty of “likening” and “asserting equivalence,” they do so on the basis of beliefs that the latter dispute. Those who affirm the attributes then reply:

“Granted that some people may call this meaning ‘likening’ in their terminology, neither reason nor revelation has ruled it out. What must be denied is only what scriptural and rational proofs negate. The Quran has denied that Allah has any likeness, equal, rival, or the like.”

However, those who affirm the attributes say that, in Arabic usage, an attribute is neither the likeness, equal, nor rival of the one it describes, and therefore does not fall within the scope of the scriptural text. As for reason, it has not ruled out what the Muʿtazilah call “likening” in their terminology.

They also say:

“Attributes can subsist only in a spatially situated body, and all bodies are alike. If attributes subsisted in Him, it would necessarily follow that He was like all other bodies. This is what constitutes likening.”

This is also asserted by many of those who affirm the divine attributes but deny His being above the Throne, deny that acts of His choosing subsist in Him, and deny other such matters. They say:

“Attributes may subsist in what is not a body. Being above the world, however, is possible only if He is a body. If we affirmed His being above it, this would necessarily entail that He is a body; and since all bodies are alike, likening would necessarily follow.”

For this reason, you find that they describe anyone who affirms His being above the world and similar matters as one who likens Him to others, but do not describe anyone who affirms His hearing, sight, speech, and similar attributes in this way. This is the position expressed by the author of al-Irshād and others like him.