The Sixth Principle

Someone may say:

In this matter, there must be a criterion by which to distinguish what is possible with respect to Allah from what is impossible, both in negation and in affirmation. Merely denying likeness, or affirming without qualification while denying likeness, is not a sound basis. For any two things have something in common and something that distinguishes them.

If someone denies an attribute on the grounds that affirming it entails likeness, he should be told: “If you mean that one is identical to the other in every respect, this is false. But if you mean that one resembles the other in some respects but not others, or shares the same name, then this also applies to everything else you affirm. You have only established evidence against likeness and equivalence as you yourselves have defined them: whatever is possible for one is possible for the other, whatever is impossible for one is impossible for the other, and whatever is necessary for one is necessary for the other. Clearly, no rational person who understands what he is saying would affirm likeness in this sense, for its impossibility is self-evident to reason. Denying this, however, does not entail denying resemblance in certain respects, as with names and attributes used in a shared sense.”

Yet some people define likeness in a particular sense, then say of anyone who affirms that meaning: “He likens Allah to His creation.” Their opponent, however, says: “That meaning does not constitute likeness.”