of any kind, and no meaning whatsoever can be understood from it, then it does not indicate what is intended by it; still less can it indicate what is not intended by it. Thus, one cannot say that this wording has been subjected to ta’wīl in the sense of being diverted from its more likely meaning to a less likely meaning, let alone say that Allah alone knows this interpretation. The only exception would be if ta’wīl meant an interpretation contrary to an apparent meaning peculiar to created beings. If someone understands “apparent meaning” in this way, then the wording must undoubtedly have an interpretation contrary to that apparent meaning.

Yet if these people say that these texts have no interpretation contrary to their apparent meaning, or that they are to be taken according to their apparent meanings, they contradict themselves. If they intend one sense of “apparent meaning” here and another there within the same discussion, without explaining the distinction, this is misleading. And if by “apparent meaning” they mean merely the wording—that is, that the texts are taken according to the wording as it appears, without understanding its meaning—then their rejection or affirmation of ta’wīl is contradictory, since anyone who affirms or denies an interpretation has already understood some meaning. These distinctions expose the contradictions of many people in this matter, both those who deny the divine attributes and those who affirm them.