that lack of effect invalidates a cause, while also saying that holding in reverse is not a condition for it. Others say, “This is a contradiction.”

The precise distinction is this: when a cause is absent, the particular ruling attached to it is absent—as in the position of someone who allows a similar ruling to arise from another cause. If that ruling exists without another cause, the original cause is known to have no effect and is invalidated. But if an equivalent ruling arises from another cause, that type of ruling has two causes. This is permissible.

For example, someone may argue concerning a woman who apostatizes: “She disbelieved after embracing Islam, so she is to be put to death by analogy with a man, because the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said:

‘It is not lawful to shed the blood of a Muslim who testifies that there is no deity worthy of worship except Allah except in one of three cases: a man who disbelieves after embracing Islam, commits adultery after having been married, or kills someone and is put to death in retaliation.’”

If he is then told, “Your qualification, ‘He disbelieved after embracing Islam,’ has no effect, for a man is put to death for disbelief alone, whereas a woman is not put to death for disbelief alone,” he replies:

“This cause is established by the explicit text, and by his saying:

‘Whoever changes his religion, put him to death.’

“As for the man, I do not put him to death merely for his disbelief, but for his disbelief and his boldness. That is why I do not put to death someone incapable of fighting, such as a decrepit old man or the like. Disbelief after embracing Islam, however, is another cause that makes shedding blood lawful. That is why someone incapable of fighting, such as an elderly man, is put to death for apostasy.”

This is the position of Mālik and Ahmad. If, however, he is among those who hold that disbelief alone