actions, whereas whoever holds that this can be known only through revelation allows all actions for Him, since no prohibition applies to Him.

The answer is: This issue does not necessarily depend on that one. Even supposing that it does, the latter requires distinctions and careful examination, which we have set out at length elsewhere. Suppose that we know through reason the goodness and evil of certain actions. Reason, however, does not regard the Creator as like the creature, such that whatever it judges good or evil for one it also judges good or evil for the other—as the Qadariyyah do—for there are many differences between the Lord and His servant. If, on the other hand, we suppose that the goodness and evil of actions can be known only through revelation, revelation has indicated that Allah has declared Himself free of certain actions and judgments—and thus it is not permissible for Him to do them—sometimes by declaring, in praise of Himself, that He does not do them, and sometimes by declaring that He has forbidden them to Himself. This clarifies the second issue.

We therefore say: Regarding Allah’s actions—what is fitting and permissible for Him and what is not—people hold three positions: two extremes and a middle position.

One extreme is that of the Qadariyyah, who restricted Him to doing only what they judged by their reason to be permissible for Him. They went so far as to lay down for Him a code defining what is just and permissible, declaring through their reason many things obligatory for Him and many things forbidden to Him. This does not mean that reason commands and forbids Him, for no rational person would say that. Rather, it means that those actions are among the things that