and we merely indicate the key points. This makes clear the middle position, namely:

The injustice that Allah has forbidden to Himself includes disregarding the good deeds of the righteous and not rewarding them for those deeds; punishing an innocent person for evil deeds he has not committed; punishing someone for another’s sin; judging between people without equity; and similar acts from which the Lord is exalted above because of His equity and justice, although He has the power to do them. He deserves praise and commendation precisely because He refrains from this injustice despite having the power to commit it. Just as Allah is exalted above attributes of deficiency and imperfection, He is also exalted above acts of deficiency and imperfection.

According to the second group’s position, however, there is no act whatsoever from which Allah must be declared free. The Quran, the Sunnah, and the consensus of the early generations of the Muslim community and its leading scholars indicate otherwise. Yet when the dialectical theologians of affirmation debated the theologians of negation, they pressed them with implications from which they could extricate themselves only by countering falsehood with falsehood. This is among the things the leading scholars criticized and condemned. Thus al-Awzāʿī, al-Zubaydī, al-Thawrī, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and others criticized countering the Qadariyyah with excessive affirmation, and enjoined adherence to the Quran and the Sunnah. They likewise criticized those who countered the Jahmiyyah, who denied the divine attributes, with such excessive affirmation that they came to liken the Creator to His creation. We have discussed both matters at length elsewhere and cited the statements of the early generations and the leading scholars concerning them.

If someone were to say:

This is based on “the question of rational judgments of good and evil.” Whoever holds that the goodness and evil of actions can be known through reason considers the Lord above certain