their meaning except Allah. Yet they contradict themselves in several ways.

First, they say that the texts are to be understood according to their apparent meanings, and they do not go beyond those meanings. Accordingly, they reject every interpretation that conflicts with the apparent meaning and affirm that meaning. At the same time, however, they say that the text has an interpretation known only to Allah, while “interpretation,” as they understand it, contradicts the apparent meaning. How, then, can it have an interpretation contrary to its apparent meaning when they have already affirmed that apparent meaning? Their opponents in debate challenged them on this point; indeed, Ibn ‘Aqīl challenged his own teacher, the judge Abū Ya‘lā, over it.

Another contradiction is that we find that whenever any of these people are confronted with a text that contradicts their position, whether on a fundamental or a subsidiary question, they invariably interpret it in strained, contrived ways that amount to distorting words from their proper places—the same sort of interpretations that the Jahmiyyah and Qadariyyah give to texts that contradict their views. How can this be reconciled with their statement, “None but Allah Most High knows the meanings of the ambiguous texts”?

Consider what you find in their books of their debates with the Mu‘tazilah concerning the divine attributes, the Quran, and divine decree. When the Mu‘tazilah support their own position by citing verses that contradict these people’s position, such as His words:

“And Allah does not love corruption.”

“And He does not approve of disbelief for His servants.”

“I did not create jinn and mankind except to worship Me.”

“No vision can encompass Him.”

“His command, when He wills a thing, is only to say to it, ‘Be,’ and it is.”

“And when your Lord said to the angels”

and similar verses, observe how they interpret these texts in ways that are mostly unsound