If, however, the person being addressed denies the attributes but acknowledges the names—as does the Muʿtazilī who says that He is Living, All-Knowing and All-Powerful, yet denies that He possesses life, knowledge and power—he should be told:

“There is no difference between affirming the names and affirming the attributes. If you say, ‘Affirming life, knowledge and power entails likening Him to creation or attributing corporeality to Him, because in the observable world we find nothing possessing these attributes except bodies,’ you are told, ‘Likewise, in the observable world we find nothing called living, knowing or powerful except bodies.’ If you deny these attributes because you have observed them only in bodies, then deny the names too—indeed, deny everything—for you observe it only in bodies. Every argument used by someone who denies the attributes can also be used by someone who denies the Most Beautiful Names. Whatever answer you give to the latter is also available to those who affirm the attributes.”

If the person being addressed is among the extremists who deny both the names and the attributes, and says:

“I do not say that He exists, or that He is living, knowing or powerful. Rather, these names belong to His creatures, for they are figurative: affirming them would entail likening Him to that which exists, lives and knows,”

he should be told:

“Likewise, if you say that He does not exist and is neither living, knowing nor powerful, you would be likening Him to nonexistent things, which is even worse than likening Him to existing things.”

If he says, “I deny both negation and affirmation,” he should be told:

“Then you must liken Him to impossible things in which two contradictories coincide, for it is impossible for a thing to be both existent and nonexistent