And what these philosophers say about the rational soul—that it cannot be pointed to, cannot be described as moving or being at rest, ascending or descending, and is neither within the world nor outside it—is likewise, in the judgment of the great majority of rational thinkers, even more false than what those speculative theologians say. This applies especially to the claim made by some of them—such as Ibn Sīnā and his like—that it knows nothing of particulars, but knows only universals. This is a blatant denial of the obvious: the soul knows its own body and knows everything it sees, smells, hears, and tastes through the body, as well as what it seeks, commands, loves, and hates, and everything else with which it engages through its knowledge and action. How, then, can it be said that it does not know particular things, but knows only universals?

Likewise, their claim that its connection to the body is merely one of governance and direction, like a king’s governance of his kingdom, is utterly unsound. A king manages the affairs of his kingdom, issuing commands and prohibitions, but he cannot direct his subjects by his own will and power unless they themselves act by their own will and power. Nor does the king experience the pleasure that any one of them experiences, or suffer the pain that he suffers. The relationship between the soul and the body is not like this. Rather, Allah has established between them such union and harmony that no known counterpart can serve as an analogy.

Yet the soul’s entry into the body does not resemble the entry of any observable physical body into another. Its entry into the body is not like that of water and similar liquids into vessels. These liquids touch only the vessels’ inner surfaces, not their inner substance or outer surfaces. They come into contact only with