the early generations; indeed, what is reliably reported from them contradicts these doctrines.” Thus, because the theologians displayed considerable shortcomings and ignorance concerning the realities of the religious sciences, while in rational matters they sometimes agreed with the philosophers in their falsehoods and sometimes opposed them in their truths, the advantage in their debates shifted from one side to the other. Nevertheless, the theologians are more correct overall in rational questions concerning divine matters and universals, just as they are closer to the revealed teachings than the philosophers. For the philosophers’ discourse on divine matters and rational universals is exceedingly deficient and contains much confusion. They speak well only about sensible, natural matters and the universal principles governing them; their discourse on these subjects is generally sound.

As for the unseen matters reported by the prophets, the rational universals encompassing everything that exists, and the correct classification of all existing things, they have no knowledge of these whatsoever. Such knowledge is possible only for someone whose knowledge encompasses the various kinds of existing things. Yet they know only sensible things and some of their necessary implications, and this amounts to knowledge of very little indeed of what exists. For the things human beings do not witness far surpass those they witness in magnitude and attributes.

Consequently, when these people, who have learned what the philosophers know, hear the prophets’ reports about the angels, the Throne, the Kursī, Paradise, and Hell—while supposing that nothing exists beyond what they and the philosophers know—they become bewildered and reinterpret the prophets’ words to fit what they know, although there is no evidence for this, nor do they have, for this