revelation; he should therefore explain it in scriptural terms. If it is assumed that revelation does not indicate it, then it is not something people are obliged to believe. In that case, no one is entitled to call people to it, even assuming that it is true in itself.

The great majority of speculative theologians have been inconsistent on the question of whether bodies are alike and whether they are composed of indivisible atoms. Many of them adopt one position at one time and another at another time. Most of this stems from ambiguous expressions and meanings that are difficult to distinguish. This has been discussed at length elsewhere.

The point here, however, is that even if a person came to understand that bodies are neither alike nor composite in either of the two ways, he would not be entitled to introduce into the religion of Islam the novel statement, “Allah is a body,” and argue for the sound meaning indicated by the Book and Sunnah. Rather, it is sufficient for him to affirm that meaning in scriptural terms. Likewise, even if he came to understand that bodies are alike and that a body is composite, he would not be entitled to introduce a denial using this designation and argue for the meaning he had come to believe through his own reasoning. Rather, that meaning, known through revelation and reason, can be expressed in language free of ambiguity and confusion.

Many of those who say that a body (jism) is composed of atoms claim that this is also its meaning in the Arabic language, because the Arabs say, “This is more massive (ajsam) than that,” meaning that it has more parts than the other. They also say, “This is massive (jasīm),” meaning that it has many parts.