exist except in the mind, not in external reality. This has been discussed at length elsewhere: the falsity of their claims concerning divine oneness and the attributes has been demonstrated, and their specious arguments concerning composition have been refuted in many ways. Thus, the principle on which they base their assertion that “from one only one can emanate” is itself unsound.

Third:

Their claim that things, despite their multiplicity and their coming into existence, emanate from a single, simple being is utterly unsound.

Fourth:

No single, simple being is known in the world from which anything has emanated—whether one thing or two. Thus, this universal claim is not known to hold true in any instance whatsoever.

Fifth:

They say that one emanated from Him, and that from this one emanated an intellect, a soul, and a celestial sphere. The response is this: if what emanated from Him is one in every respect, then only one can emanate from that one as well. It would follow that everything in the world consists only of one emanating from one, which is a blatant denial of the obvious. If, however, the first emanation contains any multiplicity in any respect, then something containing multiplicity—not something one in every respect—has emanated from the First. Thus, something that is not one has emanated from the One.

For this reason, their later thinkers fell into confusion. Abū al-Barakāt, the author of al-Muʿtabar, refuted this doctrine and rejected it in the strongest terms. Ibn Rushd the grandson claimed that the celestial sphere, together with everything within it, emanates from the First. Al-Tūsī, the minister of the heretics, takes a similar position; thus he made the First