this were permissible, it would also be permissible to call all a person’s temporally originated attributes things generated from him, and to call them his sons. When a Qadarī theologian says that knowledge acquired through reflection is generated by it, this is like saying that satiety and the quenching of thirst are generated by eating and drinking. He does not say that knowledge is his son or offspring, just as he does not say that satiety and the quenching of thirst are his sons or offspring. This concerns the generation of accidents and qualities inhering in a human being; these are not called his offspring or sons.

Anyone who metaphorically speaks of the “little daughters of his thought” is using an expression like “little daughters of the road” for side paths, “son of the road” for a traveler, or “son of water” for a waterbird. These are qualified designations, understood not to convey the ordinary meanings of father and son, parent and offspring. Moreover, nowhere in the prophets’ words is any attribute of Allah called a son. Anyone who interprets any of their words in this way has falsely attributed this to them. Christian scholars themselves acknowledge this. Wherever the term “son” occurs in their texts concerning the Messiah, Israel, or others, it designates a created being, not any attribute of the Creator, and means that the person is honored and revered.

Fourth:

Even supposing that matters were as they claim, if what the Messiah received was the knowledge and speech that Allah taught him, this is also found among all the other prophets. There would therefore be no reason to single him out as the Son of Allah. But if they mean that knowledge and speech constitute a god that united with him, then knowledge and speech would be a self-subsisting substance. If that substance is the Father, then the Messiah would be the Father. If knowledge and speech are another substance, then there would be two gods subsisting