animal was eaten by another human being. If those parts are restored to one, they cannot be restored to the other. A further objection was raised against them: the human body is constantly losing matter, so what is to be restored? Is it what was present at the time of death?

If that is the answer, it follows that the person will be restored in a frail condition, contrary to what the scriptural texts state. If some other body is meant, no one body has a stronger claim than another. Some of them therefore claimed that a human being has original constituent parts that never break down and contain nothing from the animal eaten by the second person. Yet rational people know that the human body itself breaks down entirely, with none of its matter remaining.

Thus, their account of resurrection helped strengthen the philosophers’ specious argument for denying bodily resurrection. It also led a group of speculative thinkers to hold that Allah creates another body to which the soul returns, and that the purpose is to bring bliss or punishment to the soul, whether this occurs in the body or elsewhere. This, too, contradicts the explicit scriptural texts affirming the restoration of this very body.

This is what is set out in al-Rāzī’s books. On the major questions concerning the foundations of religion, neither his books nor those of his peers contain the correct position that accords with revelation and reason—the position with which Allah sent the Messenger and which was held by the early generations of the Muslim community and its leading scholars. Instead, he presents the discussions of heretical philosophers and those of innovating speculative theologians who built upon the principles of the Jahmiyyah and the Qadariyyah concerning creation and resurrection, the beginning and the final return. Both approaches are unsound, since they constructed their account upon unsound premises. As for the position held by