This is why, when Abū Abd Allāh al-Rāzī presented the proofs for “establishing the existence of the Maker,” he mentioned four approaches: the contingency of entities, their temporal origination, the contingency of attributes, and their temporal origination. The first three approaches are weak—indeed, invalid. For they described the entities whose origination or contingency, or whose attributes’ contingency, they asserted in ambiguous terms that do not distinguish the Creator from creation, and they offered no sound proof for their claims.

As for “the fourth approach”—arguing from the origination of things known to have come into existence—it is sound and is the approach of the Quran. Yet they fell woefully short in pursuing it, for, according to their own principles, they have witnessed no entities coming into existence, but only attributes. The Quran’s approach, by contrast, demonstrates that everything other than Allah is created and is a sign pointing to Him. The proofs and signs contained in the Quran, which these speculative theologians and philosophers have failed to reach, have been discussed at length elsewhere, as has the fact that whatever truth they possess is only a part of what the Quran establishes.

The point here is that, since their account of the beginning of creation rested on this principle—namely, affirming the existence of indivisible atoms—their account of resurrection was likewise built upon it. They thus divided into two positions. Some say that the substances cease to exist and are then brought back into existence. Others say that the parts disperse and are then gathered together. An objection was then raised against them concerning a human being eaten by an animal, and that