a group among Ahl al-Sunnah who affirm divine decree, because they assumed that there must be wisdom inherent in the act commanded or forbidden, and that He therefore cannot forbid the very thing He has commanded.

This is the logical implication of the view that abrogation restricts a ruling’s temporal scope, since restricting the scope of wording does not eliminate everything it denotes. Yet they contradicted themselves.

The Jahmī determinists maintain that no wise purpose arises from either the command itself or the act commanded, and that Allah creates nothing for a wise purpose. Rather, sheer will necessitated whatever occurred and the selection of one of two equivalent alternatives without any determining factor. Good deeds are not causes of reward, nor are evil deeds causes of punishment. Neither possesses any quality by virtue of which it is good or evil. Rather, a good deed means nothing more than an act to which a command applies, and an evil deed means nothing more than an act to which a prohibition applies. Thus, it is possible for Him to command anything—even disbelief, wickedness, and disobedience—and to forbid anything—even monotheism, truthfulness, and justice. Were He to do so, it would be just as if He had commanded monotheism, truthfulness, and justice, and forbidden polytheism, lying, and injustice.

This is what some of them say. Others say that anything may be commanded provided it does not preclude recognition of the command, unlike that which does preclude its recognition. In their view, there are no causes in existence. Rather, when one thing is associated with another, whether in creation or in revealed law, it becomes a sign of it. Deeds are therefore nothing but signs, not effective causes.

They also said that commanding those who have not believed to believe means: “I intend to punish you