differences in excellence, equivalence, or multiplicity. As for the assertion that the Lord’s attributes do not differ in excellence—sometimes expressed as “What is beginningless does not admit differences in excellence,” which resembles the assertion of the Jahmiyyah, the Mu'tazilah, and others that “What is beginningless does not admit multiplicity”—this is an ambiguous expression. If “what is beginningless” means the Lord of the worlds, then the Lord of the worlds is indeed one God, without partner. But if it means His attributes, then whoever says that the Lord’s attributes do not admit multiplicity is saying that knowledge is power, power is will, and hearing and sight are knowledge. Some of them may also say that knowledge is speech, while others say that knowledge and power are will. They may then say that the attribute is identical with the one possessing it: knowledge is the one who knows, and power is the one who possesses power.

These assertions have been explicitly made by those philosophers, Jahmiyyah, and others who deny the divine attributes, as I have quoted their actual words elsewhere. These assertions plainly contradict sound reason and authentic transmitted evidence—indeed, they contradict what rational people know self-evidently and what is necessarily known in the religion of Islam and the religion of the messengers—to such an extent that their utter invalidity, both in revelation and in reason, is clear.

These people then interpreted the texts of the Quran and the Sunnah in invalid ways. Some said that describing it as greater, more excellent, and better merely means that it is great in itself. They refused to understand these descriptions as expressing superiority. This position has been attributed to al-Ash'arī, Ibn al-Bāqillānī, and a number of others. Anyone who reflects on the wording of the Quran and the Sunnah will plainly see that it cannot bear this meaning; rather, this is a form of Qarmatian interpretation. For Allah