to him, “Are some parts of Allah’s speech superior to others?” he cannot, on his own premises, answer either yes or no, since he considers it indivisible and does not regard its verbal expression as Allah’s speech.
But suppose “speech” means the verbal expression, or he is asked, “Are some parts of the Quran superior to others?”—meaning by “Quran” the Arabic speech brought down by Gabriel, which he considers created, not spoken by Allah, but composed by Gabriel or someone else. Or suppose he is asked, “Are some of Allah’s scriptures superior to others?”—while Allah’s Book, according to him, is the Arabic Quran, which he considers created. Such a question would appear applicable to his position. In reality, however, both are impossible on his premises, because verbal expressions signify meanings: the meanings subsisting within the self are conveyed by verbal expressions. It is known that verbal expressions signify diverse meanings, whereas his premise allows only a single meaning. It is therefore necessarily impossible, as a matter of reason, for the entire Arabic Quran, the Torah, the Gospel, and all other verbal expressions attributed to Allah to signify only one meaning admitting neither multiplicity nor division. Thus, verbal expressions signifying meanings cannot be divisible unless those meanings are divisible as well.
For this reason, they have been asked: “When Moses, peace be upon him, heard Allah’s speech, did he hear all of it or only part of it?” If you say, “All of it,” then he knew everything Allah has communicated and everything He has commanded. Yet it is authentically reported that al-Khidr said to him:
“My knowledge and yours have diminished Allah’s knowledge only as much as this sparrow has diminished this sea.”
And indeed,